Anti-Americanism is growing at a startling rate in South Korea, potentially escalating into a serious problem that could jeopardize the future of the U.S.-Korean alliance. Although previously limited to the concern of a minority of leftist nongovernmental organizations, student activists, and some liberals, anti-American sentiments have now spread into almost all strata of Korean society, ranging from the policymaking elite in the government and the intellectuals to members of the middle class and the younger generation.

Beyond its overall increase, the sources of anti-Americanism have become more complex and diverse. Following the attacks on September 11, ironically, U.S. policy toward North Korea has become another cause of popular South Korean resentment toward the United States. According to a recent public opinion poll, 63 percent of South Koreans have unfavorable feelings toward the United States, and 56 percent feel that anti-Americanism is growing stronger in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Unless Washington and Seoul work together on a course of action to counter this trend, these popular Korean attitudes could become a critical wildcard harming the future of the U.S.-Korean relationship.

Saber Rattling and Sunshine

Following George W. Bush’s announcement of a new U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address, a new wave of resentment toward the United States hit South Korea. Bush’s denunciation of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” and his threat to take preemptive ac-

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tions against Pyongyang have angered many in South Korea, leading them to believe that the United States was escalating the possibility of a crisis on the peninsula as part of its global war on terrorism. Many Koreans felt that Bush’s new policy put South Korea’s security interests at risk and poured ice water on the country’s efforts to continue overtures with the North.

U.S. policy toward the North after September 11 and the South’s “sunshine policy” engaging the North complicate the U.S.-ROK relationship because of Bush’s and ROK president Kim Dae-jung’s diametrically opposed views on North Korea. Kim Dae-jung has a positive view of the leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He believes that the DPRK is changing to ensure the survival of its regime and that South Korea’s engagement policy will eventually bear fruit. Washington’s hard-line approach toward North Korea attempts to prevent Pyongyang from assisting terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including missiles, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biochemical weapons. North Korea is presently included on the U.S. Department of State’s list of states that sponsor terrorism and has a record of exporting missile technology and military equipment to rogue states, including Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Bush questions the wisdom of negotiating with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, whom he perceives as a dictator and an unreliable leader who starves his country’s people yet earns millions from selling weapons to rogue states. Bush’s new policy, however, was a major blow to Kim Dae-jung, who has been pursuing engagement with North Korea since entering office. Bush’s harsh rhetoric toward the North and the disastrous U.S.-ROK summit in March 2001 gave rise to the widespread perception in Seoul of the Bush administration’s disapproval of Kim Dae-jung and his engagement policy.

Consequently, anxiety and resentment among liberal South Korean politicians and some government officials surrounding Kim Dae-jung have erupted. South Korea’s ambassador to the United States, Yang Sung-chul, complained that Bush’s speech dismayed the Korean government and warned about “unnecessary tensions or escalation of rhetoric.” Some liberal Korean legislators issued a statement criticizing the U.S. administration, saying that “Bush and his hawkish foreign policy advisers were heightening tensions on the Korean peninsula and expanding the war on terrorism in an attempt to justify an increased U.S. defense budget, detract from the Enron scandal, and lay the groundwork to win the November elections.” More di-
rect criticism has come from the members of Kim Dae-jung’s inner circle. In December 2001, the spokesman of his ruling New Millennium Party remarked that the “U.S. government was thwarting the sunshine policy despite the clear sign from the North to expand cooperation.” Immediately after his visit to Pyongyang in April 2002, Kim Dae-jung’s confidant and special adviser on North Korean affairs, Lim Dong-won, blamed the Bush administration for the failure of Kim Jong-il’s reciprocal visit to Seoul. The South Korean government had hoped to highlight Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy with the North through such a visit.

The negative attitudes of leading Korean policymakers toward the Bush administration have resonated within the general public. Korean resentment erupted into strong anti-American protests across the country during Bush’s visit to Seoul in February 2002. Some student activists intruded and staged violent protests in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce under the slogan “opposition to the visit of President Bush.” A large majority of Koreans who have desired reconciliation with the North saw Bush’s approach as unilateral and high-handed. Much of the Korean public views the United States as an angry and mighty giant who does not care about its friends. A February 2002 public opinion poll found that 6 out of 10 Koreans are not “sympathetic” to Bush’s “axis of evil” statement linking North Korea to Iraq and Iran.

Not all members of Korean society totally rebutted the Bush administration’s hard-line stance. Many conservatives, who criticized Kim Dae-jung for being too generous through his sunshine policy toward North Korea, welcomed Bush’s approach. They viewed Bush’s stance as a hedge against the danger of the South making excessive concessions to the North in an effort to develop the North-South relationship rapidly during Kim Dae-jung’s term. These conservatives, however, continue to remain silent and are reluctant to take any course of action.

Sources and Amplifiers

Believing that Bush’s harsh rhetoric after September 11 created the problem, however, would be naïve, when it was merely a spark that inflamed anti-American sentiment in South Korea that already existed, if to a lesser extent, prior to September 11. U.S. military bases on Korean soil, the Korean media’s negative image of the United States, changing demographics, Korean nationalism, and skepticism have all contributed to rising resentment toward the United States. The foundation of this trend may be general impressions of U.S. arrogance globally and a sense of U.S. domination in South Korea in particular that have directly fostered resentment, and even humiliation, among the Korean people.
As memories of the Korean War fade and the threat from the North diminishes, long-standing resentment over the basing of 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea only grows stronger. Issues surrounding U.S. bases, such as noise and environmental pollution, Yongsan’s location in midtown Seoul, and the Status of Forces Agreement, have rankled Korean pride and offended notions of sovereignty. An accident in June 2002, in which two middle-school girls were struck and killed by a U.S.-armored vehicle participating in a training exercise in Uijongbu City, 25 miles north of Seoul, further exacerbated Korean ill will toward the United States.

Although the accident was clearly a mistake, the way it was mishandled and a sense of U.S. influence in both the investigation and the judicial process caused a flurry of anti-American protests. The United States’ insistence soon after the incident that “no one was at fault” was perceived as an extension of U.S. arrogance and even seemed degrading to the Korean people. Furthermore, when Koreans learned that the U.S. Army led the investigation while the Korean police and military had little influence and that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) flatly declined the Korean request for jurisdiction, many Koreans—from students to policymakers to intellectuals—saw the situation as indicative of the unequal, U.S.-dominated nature of the bilateral relationship in general. They demanded the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement. As the level of anti-American protests increased, U.S. soldiers unprecedentedly held a candlelight vigil for the accident victims, and U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell and U.S. ambassador Thomas Hubbard officially apologized and expressed regret. Nevertheless, the anger of the Korean public has not subsided.

The negative image of the United States portrayed by the media further exacerbates anti-American sentiment in South Korea. Media reports often ignore the positive aspects of U.S. policy and frequently create a negative climate in which the United States can be criticized. An incident during the 2002 Winter Olympics held in Utah—when Korean short-track skater Kim Dong-sung lost to Apollo Anton Ono, a U.S. contender, as a result of a controversial ruling by an Australian judge—was an example in which the media coverage inflamed resentment toward the United States. Although the United States had no involvement in this incident beyond the venue, the country was blamed. When officials disqualified the Korean skater in the last lap of the final short-track race for blocking the U.S. skater, the Korean public became furious at the U.S. skater for putting on what they believed
was an acting performance that eventually won him a gold medal. The Koreans’ belief that the U.S. gold medal was stolen was supported by the U.S. broadcasting company NBC’s Internet poll conducted in the United States immediately after the incident, to which 96 percent of respondents answered that the ruling was “unfair.” The reenactment of the Winter Olympics speed-skating event by Korean soccer players after their first goal against the United States in the 2002 World Cup reflected the extent of Korean displeasure with events in Utah.

Given these circumstances, Korean anger intensified when NBC’s “Tonight Show” host Jay Leno made the racially discriminatory remark, as he defended the referee’s decision at the Winter Olympics, that “the Korean player had been angry enough to have kicked and eaten a dog when he returned home.” South Korea’s major television networks repeatedly aired Leno’s comments, accompanied by negative comments on U.S. attitudes, while condemnation and protests against the United States flooded the Internet and spread throughout the country. In an unprecedented move, some Koreans even started an anti-American campaign by boycotting U.S. products, including F-15E fighter aircraft and Coca-Cola, as well as franchised U.S. restaurants such as McDonalds.

Korea’s changing demographic structure is also a major factor in the rise of anti-Americanism. Members of the generations involved in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in particular, have an emotional tie to the United States, based on shared Cold War experiences. This generation is aging, however, and constitutes a diminishing percentage—21 percent—of South Korea’s population. Two-thirds of the country’s population is under the age of 40, and younger Koreans’ attitudes toward the United States are knotty. They recognize the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance for their security against North Korea, but they are reluctant to tolerate perceived U.S. arrogance and U.S. political as well as economic domination. In addition, they have a more negative image of the United States’ status as the world’s only superpower. Because they tie U.S. political and economic domination to the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, younger Koreans increasingly want to see a significant reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea or even a complete withdrawal.

“Ideological anti-Americanism” has existed among a small minority of urban leftists and extremists from academia, the press, labor unions, and churches in South Korea for quite some time. In the 1980s and into the
1990s, these groups, influenced by the North Korean political ideology of *juche* (self-reliance), openly displayed their anger toward the United States through violent street protests and made demands that were often identical to those made by North Koreans, including the expulsion of U.S. forces from the South. These protests largely failed to penetrate the general public in South Korea. The groups’ activities dissipated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the evident failure of the DPRK system over the past decades. Now, however, these groups serve to exacerbate the problem by instigating and taking the lead in organizing anti-American activities in South Korea. Though small in number, the leftists facilitate the spread of anti-American sentiment by effectively manipulating the liberal press and leveraging the Internet as well as cellular phone communications to enhance their impact.

Some members of another sector within the Korean general population—intellectuals—consider the United States an arrogant, unilateralist nation that disregards South Korea and its national pride. Despite all the emphasis on the importance of the U.S.-Korean alliance by both countries, Seoul has had the bitter experience of being largely ignored as Washington dealt with important issues affecting Korean national interests. Bush’s “axis of evil” statement is only the most recent example; the Clinton administration’s treatment of the North Korean nuclear issue in the mid-1990s is another. Seoul was largely left out of the decisionmaking process as Washington was pursuing bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. This omission insulted many in the South and angered a great number of otherwise pro-American conservatives.

Moreover, scarring episodes of U.S. disloyalty reach even further back than the last decade. In 1905, through a secret agreement between U.S. secretary of war William H. Taft and imperial Japan’s Prime Minister Count Katsura Taro, Koreans believe that the United States sold out Korea to Japan by approving Japan’s domination over Korea in return for Japanese approval of U.S. domination in the Philippines. The United States blatantly disregarded the 1882 bilateral U.S.-Korean treaty, in which the United States promised to provide “good offices” in the event of an external threat.

Many Korean intellectuals also believe that the United States holds responsibility both for the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the division of Korea. In their view, Korea’s division was driven by U.S. suppres-
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ion of popular and leftist movements during the military occupation of 1945–1948. Then, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea in 1949, followed by then–Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s announcement in January 1950 that South Korea would be outside the U.S. defense perimeter in the Asia-Pacific region, openly invited Communist aggression from the North in June 1950. Yet, at the same time, they appreciate and recognize the United States as a liberator after World War II and as their savior during the Korean War. Today, however, Koreans are skeptical and believe that, if necessary, the United States may abandon South Korea again in favor of U.S. global strategic interests.

A rise in anti-Americanism might be a component in the natural path of South Korea's graduation from a client state to a dynamic and vibrant member of the international community. Korean self-confidence and national pride have grown commensurately with increasing sophistication, economic success, and international prestige exemplified by its membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, its growth into the twelfth-largest economy in the world, its hosting the 1988 Summer Olympics, and its cohosting the 2002 World Cup with Japan. These developments have led Koreans to question some of the country’s past practices, values, and relationships; to seek greater political and security independence from the United States; and to demand a more equal partnership and mutual respect in the bilateral relationship.

To be fair, however, anti-Americanism is probably rising because nationalism is increasing both in South Korea and the United States. U.S. nationalism is influenced by the country’s status as the sole global superpower, while Korean nationalism grows as the country becomes more industrialized. Koreans are satisfied with an alliance with the United States as well as with U.S. leadership in the international community, but they increasingly emphasize the value of national pride, equality in the relationship, and greater independence from the United States.

How Low Can We Go?

Looking ahead, anti-Americanism in South Korea is unlikely to disappear. It has been accumulating over the protracted period of the bilateral relationship, and its causes are too complex to be resolved overnight. The level of anti-American sentiment is expected to fluctuate with events over time. Current trends suggest the great possibility that South Korea’s resentment toward the United States will become more aggravated in coming years. Despite the long history of the alliance, the discrepancy between both countries’ national strengths and goals could lead to a serious conflict of interests.
at the same time that cultural and conceptual differences continue to cause emotional resentment.

Strikingly, a substantial increase in China’s popularity in Korean society has accompanied the rise in anti-Americanism. According to a public opinion poll, China is the most popular country among the four major Asian powers and is more popular than the United States. A majority of Koreans feels that South Korea’s relationship with China will be more important in the future than its relationship with the United States. The causes for these opinions are inexplicable. They may result from more than just cultural affinities and economic complementarities. China has been extremely skillful in its diplomacy, as Koreans feel that, of the major Asian powers, China gives South Korea the most respect. How long, deep, or lasting such a sentiment will prove over time is uncertain. South Korea will probably not sacrifice the benefits of its special relationship with the United States for a closer relationship with China in the future, but these trends suggest that emotions influence the Korean public’s attitudes more than national interests do.

More significantly, a change in South Korea’s demographic composition suggests that members of the younger generation, who have ambivalent but primarily negative attitudes toward the United States, will soon take the lead in Korean society as the older generation, which is more supportive of the United States, fades away. If not curtailed, continued development of such trends could jeopardize the U.S.-Korean alliance. According to a May 2002 public opinion poll, only 56 percent of Koreans surveyed want to maintain a U.S.-Korean alliance—substantially down from 89 percent in 1999.

A side effect of the sunshine policy is the public perception that the military threat from North Korea and the possibility of war have been dramatically reduced. A public opinion poll indicates that 90 percent of Koreans believe the possibility of a war on the Korean peninsula is either “very” or “relatively” low. The Korean government has echoed the public sentiment by maintaining that the sunshine policy guarantees peace and stability on the peninsula. Furthermore, the June 2000 South-North summit has raised the expectations of the government and much of the public to levels that no longer tolerate anti-North Korean actions and policy or criticism of Kim Jong-il.

All of these developments tremendously impact U.S.-Korean relations in general and anti-Americanism in particular. As the sense of military threat from the North abates, the perceived importance of the U.S. military presence
in South Korea also diminishes among Koreans. Many even believe the USFK to be thwarting South-North reconciliation progress. For the most part, the Korean government has been sympathetic to public sentiment on this issue, providing motivational support to anti-American groups and activities.

This threat perception is clearly not shared in the United States. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate in March 2002, Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, then-USFK commander in chief, stated that the North Korean military threat is still serious and real, elevated by the development of WMD. At present, the Kim Jong-il regime maintains 70 percent of its 1.2 million armed forces—the fifth largest active-duty military force in the world—within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), making the area between Seoul and Pyongyang the most militarized area on the planet. Even more striking, the North Korean government's disclosure of its clandestine development of a uranium enrichment program in early October 2002 threatens to nullify the 1994 Agreed Framework. Combined with the North's missile capabilities, its capability to weaponize biological warfare agents, and a significant chemical weapon supply, recent developments seem to further convince many in the United States of the legitimacy of General Schwartz's earlier statements on the lasting importance of the U.S. security commitment to South Korea.

Even worse, Korean attitudes toward the United States in turn reverberate back through U.S. attitudes toward South Korea. The rise of anti-American sentiment in South Korea only means that U.S. resentment toward South Korea will likely grow in response to negative Korean attitudes and policies. This dynamic has the potential to become a dangerous, downward spiral of increasing tensions between populations and even governments. An escalating clash between anti-Americanism in South Korea and anti-Koreanism in the United States could undermine the U.S.-Korean alliance—exactly what the North Korean leadership would like to see.

Some U.S. citizens feel that the Korean public has unfairly blamed the United States for no apparent reason, as was the case in the gold medal controversy in Utah. In recent years, benign U.S. policies seem to have gone unappreciated in South Korea. The United States has served as a shield to protect South Korea over the past five decades in accordance with the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet, when terrorists threatened U.S. security, South Korea's political leadership and the Korean people provided lukewarm support in response to the U.S. request for help.
The future of the U.S.-Korean alliance is too important for Washington and Seoul to overlook this current trend of rising anti-Americanism and the potential rise of anti-Koreanism, as they directly threaten the special U.S.-ROK symbiotic relationship. The alliance with the United States is critical for South Korea to preserve stability on the peninsula and in the region. In addition, Korean instability that could arise in the absence of a U.S. security commitment would complicate Korean efforts to sustain current and expected levels of foreign investments throughout the country, thus threatening continued economic progress. Regional stability is also critical for South Korea because it conducts more than two-thirds of its trade in the Asia-Pacific region, with the volume of current South Korean trade through Asian naval transport routes exceeding 40 percent of its total trade. Even after unification, South Korea’s alliance with the United States will continue to be important to protect the peninsula from once again becoming the political, if not the military, battleground where the major Asian powers have historically sought regional hegemony.

The alliance with South Korea is also critical for the United States to maintain its leadership position in the Asia-Pacific region. The partnership helps prevent the eruption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, which could otherwise draw China into a reenactment of the Korean War. It helps preserve a stable balance of power in the region by hedging against the rise of an aggressive regional power and regional rivalries, and it helps protect U.S. economic interests. More than one-third of total U.S. trade is conducted with the Asia-Pacific region, and millions of U.S. jobs would be at stake if continued regional growth and development were jeopardized.

**Stemming the Tide of Discontent**

The United States and South Korea share responsibility for the rise of anti-Americanism. As long as the U.S.-ROK alliance proves to be critical to both sides, however, orchestrated efforts by the two countries are both possible and essential to counter this trend. A perfect cure might not exist, as some of the problems—manifested in things such as the Winter Olympics and late-night TV banter—are beyond the control of either side. Nevertheless, measures can be taken to halt and abate the current trend of anti-American sentiments.

By and large, the root causes of anti-Americanism in South Korea can be classified into two main categories: policy-oriented issues and emotional issues. As for the former, the two countries’ views, interests, and policies naturally cannot be exactly aligned or identical. The longer these discrepancies between the two countries are ignored or exacerbated in the course of future negotiations, however, the greater the likelihood that hostilities will
erupt or that either side will act arrogantly and try to dominate the relationship. The emotional resentment that often develops as a result can be reduced if both sides undertake serious efforts to address their roots.

At present, Washington and Seoul suffer from contradictory views and policies toward North Korea, which fosters the rise of anti-Americanism as their leverage over the North simultaneously weakens. The United States and South Korea should make efforts to maintain close cooperation and better align their strategies in dealing with North Korea. At the same time, Washington must be more aware of and sensitive to traditional Korean emotionalism, not take South Korea for granted, and make a conscious effort to avoid and counter the perceived arrogance of its actions and policies. Seoul must proactively take a firmer stance when dealing with the media as well as the public to create an environment where objective opinions can form. The public must understand the benefits of an alliance with the United States, particularly after the electoral pressures of the forthcoming presidential election in December 2002 have passed.

To alleviate, or at least abate, the policy-driven and emotional causes of anti-Americanism, Washington must take the aspirations of the Korean people into account in the bilateral relationship. In dealing with South Korea, the United States should reflect on the following points:

- The Korean people cherish and place a high value on respect; therefore, actions that demonstrate U.S. respect for Koreans, whether genuine or not, may be the secret to improving the U.S. image in South Korea substantially. As mentioned previously, an important reason for the significant increase of China's popularity in South Korea is largely the amount of respect that Koreans sense from China. The skillful manner in which China has positioned itself as South Korea's partner without appearing heavy-handed is something the United States should note and apply.

- The United States must give Koreans reason to believe that, as a committed ally and friend, it will not sacrifice South Korea under any possible circumstances in favor of U.S. interests. To counter lingering negative feelings from past incidents such as the secret 1905 U.S.-Japanese agreement, Washington should maintain close consultation and cooperation with Seoul on any matters or issues regarding U.S.-Korean relations.

- A clearer understanding of how Koreans think and what Koreans need is critical for the United States. This knowledge will help prevent cultural
and conceptual differences and misunderstandings from leading Koreans to blame the United States for problems that arise, even with no reason to do so. Koreans are emotional, and their attitudes are strongly influenced by the concept of *ki-bun*—a combination of mood, feelings, and emotions. The concept of *che-myon*—a combination of dignity, pride, and honor—is another important factor. The traditional Korean culture places an enormous value on these two ideas. No matter how generous and cautious the United States is toward Korea, the relationship may eventually become disastrous if U.S. policy and actions hurt Koreans’ *ki-bun* and *che-myon*. Korean attitudes toward the United States are likely to improve dramatically if Americans are able to understand and be aware of these factors behind Korean sentiment.

**A public outreach campaign may be instrumental to improving the U.S. image.**

Overall, a public outreach campaign conducted by both the U.S. government and the private sector may be instrumental to improving the image of the United States and deterring anti-American sentiments from rising based on emotional sources. Public outreach efforts should have two primary targets: (1) the Korean broadcasting networks, newspapers, and opinion makers at large; and (2) the younger generations, particularly those between their twenties and forties. U.S. efforts to explain the concerns and intentions underlying U.S. government policies and actions to the Korean public will go a long way toward deterring further misunderstandings and bringing about a more positive perception of the United States.

Korean newspapers and broadcast networks are key vehicles for shaping public opinion; they thereby have a responsibility to be fair, objective, and unbiased. Instead of getting caught up in an emotional rage, the Korean media should keep in mind the importance of not only the symbiotic relationship between the United States and South Korea but also of Korean national interests. Most crucially, the media must make every effort to present both sides of the story and help create a more favorable environment to improve U.S.-Korean relations and a more positive image of the United States in South Korea.

Along with U.S. efforts to present a more positive image, the Korean government should take the lead in improving the image of the United States by providing accurate information and advice to the media as well as the public. A key message—and one that should be highlighted—is the importance of national interests and the strategic and economic implications of growing anti-Americanism in South Korea.
The media and the public should not forget that political and social stability in South Korea, as well as continued economic progress, cannot be guaranteed unless security is provided and that the USFK remains a pillar of the security on the peninsula from the North’s continuing military threat. During the past few years, the Kim Dae-jung government has not only made little effort to curb anti-American sentiments but has also deemphasized security concerns in South Korea, further aggravating the negative image.

Leadership changes both in the United States and South Korea will heavily influence the course of anti-Americanism in South Korea. In the short run, following the presidential election in December 2002, the new Korean government’s attitudes toward North Korea and the United States will be an important factor that bears close observation. A government controlled by left-of-center politicians will further exacerbate anti-Americanism in South Korea; under a conservative government, the U.S. image stands a good chance of improving considerably.

Independent of governmental changes, the bottom line still remains that the well-being of the U.S.-Korean alliance is crucial for both countries. Both governments are responsible for understanding this importance, educating the public, and taking courses of action to maintain and improve the bilateral relationship. Although Koreans emotionally feel bitter toward the United States, an underlying respect for Americans and their culture still exists, evident in the Korean saying, “Yankee go home, but take me with you.” This respect must be tapped so that all can benefit.

**Notes**

5. Ibid.
6. See report on public opinion polls conducted by Media Research on February 23, 2002. See also “Poll Shows Rising Anti-Americanism.”
8. Ibid. See also “Military to Retain Authority over GIs in Korean Deaths,” Stars and


12. See report by Media Research on February 23, 2002. See also “Poll Shows Rising Anti-Americanism.”


15. For details, see report on public opinion polls conducted by Media Research in May 2002; Hankook Ilbo (Seoul), May 28, 2002. See also Levin, The Shape of Korea’s Future, p. 33.
